

Message Text

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ACTION PM-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 IO-03 OIC-01 L-02

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 AEC-05 MBFR-02 ACDA-10

OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-10 NEA-06 PRS-01 SAJ-01 RSR-01

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R 201042 Z JUN 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5815

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS

USDEL SALT

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 08785

LIMDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; SHAPE FOR
INTAF.

E. O. 11652: X- GDS-1

TAGS: PARM, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR: STATIONED/ INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTION

ISSUE AFTER COPENHAGEN MINISTERIAL.

REF: BONN 8421

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR' S CONVERSATION WITH EGON BAHR AND
EMBOFF' S MEETING WITH GERMAN MBFR DEL CHIEF RUTH
CONFIRM THE IMPRESSION GIVEN BY RECENT DPC STATEMENT
OF DEFMIN LEBER AND NAC REMARKS OF FONMIN SCHEEL--

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NAMELY, STRONG FRG PREFERENCE FOR US OPTION- I AND INCREASING STRENGTH OF THOSE GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARGUING FOR SOME TYPE OF TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS (I. E. BUNDESWEHR) FORCES IN INITIAL MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THESE GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE PARTICULARLY STRENGTHENED BY THE STRONG SUPPORT AND ENHANCED MBFR ACTIVITY OF BAHR, WHOSE POSITION IS TIED TO THE AIM OF ASSYMMETRICAL CUTS IN SOVIET STATIONED TROOPS. AS IS EXPLAINED BELOW, THE FONOFF HOPES THAT THE COPENHAGEN STATEMENTS OF SCHEEL AND DUTCH FONMIN VAN DER STOEL COULD PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE FORMULATION. GIVEN THE ABOVE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE COMMENTS MADE TO EMBOFF BY BRITISH EMBASSY OFFICIAL, WE BELIEVE AN EFFORT TO SECURE GERMAN SUPPORT FOR INITIAL STATIONED FORCE CUT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD COME AT LEAST INITIALLY FROM OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND WOULD HAVE TO BE AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVEL IF THEY ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. IN A CONVERSATION ON JUNE 19 WITH AMBASSADOR, MINISTER- WITHOUT- PORTFOLIO BAHR CONFIRMED THAT, NOW THAT THE MAJOR INITIATIVES IN EASTERN POLICY HAD BEEN TAKEN, HE PLANNED TO DEVOTE MORE OF HIS TIME TO ADVISING THE CHANCELLOR ON FORTHCOMING EAST/ WEST NEGOTIATIONS ON CSCE AND MBFR. AS FAR AS CSCE WAS CONCERNED, BAHR STATED FRANKLY THAT HE PERSONALLY REGARDED THE WHOLE EXERCISE AS ONE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE, FROM WHICH THE WEST COULD HOPE TO GAIN VERY LITTLE. THE REALLY IMPORTANT SUBSTANCE WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE MBFR CONTEXT.

2. BAHR CLEARLY STATED HIS PREFERENCE FOR DISCUSSING INDIGENOUS REDUCTIONS AT THE SAME TIME AS STATIONED FORCE REDUCTIONS, ALTHOUGH THE FORMER MIGHT FOLLOW THE LATTER CHRONOLOGICALLY. IN THIS, HE LINED UP ESSENTIALLY WITH DEFMIN LEBER AGAINST THOSE IN THE FONOFF WHO FAVORED THE US POSITION OF CONCENTRATING FIRST ON STATIONED FORCES. HE GAVE THREE REASONS WHICH HE SAID CONVINCED HIM OF THE NECESSITY FOR CONSIDERING INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF MBFR DISCUSSIONS:

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(A) ASSUMING THAT OPTION- I (POSSIBLY COMBINED WITH SOME VARIANT OF OPTION- III) OF THE US PROPOSALS WERE TO BE ADVANCED BY THE WESTERN SIDE, HE COULD NOT CONCEIVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY SORT OF FORCE CEILINGS WITH ASSYMMETRICAL IMPLICATIONS UNLESS THE BUNDESWEHR WERE INCLUDED. EVEN THEN, HE CONSIDERED IT UNLIKELY. FROM THE GERMAN

POINT OF VIEW, HE ADDED, OPTION- II WAS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE.

(B) ONLY BY ADOPTING THE COMMON CEILING APPROACH IN SUCH A WAY AS TO INCLUDE INDIGENOUS FORCES WAS THERE ANY HOPE OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE WESTERN SIDE AT THE SAME TIME ON MINIMUM FORCE LEVELS TO BE MAINTAINED. WITHOUT SUCH AGREEMENT, HE FEARED THAT THE EROSION PROCESS IN ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURES WOULD BECOME UNCONTROLLABLE.

(C) AS DEFMIN LEBER HAD EMPHASIZED, THE INCLUSION
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CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 RSR-01 AEC-05 MBFR-02

ACDA-10 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-10 NEA-06 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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R 201042 Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5816
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS
USDEL SALT
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 08785

LIMDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; SHAPE FOR
INTAF.

OF INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS WAS REQUIRED BY THE
POLITICAL REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC.

3. BAHR OBSERVED THAT, AFTER THE BREZHNEV TALKS HERE
IN BONN, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD
APPROACH THIS WHOLE SUBJECT MOST CONSERVATIVELY.
BREZHNEV HAD TALKED ABOUT SMALL REDUCTIONS, WHICH BAHR
INTERPRETED TO MEAN PERHAPS ONE DIVISION IN THE GDR,
DURING A FIRST PHASE, THEN A WAITING PERIOD TO BE
FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER SIMILAR SMALL REDUCTION. IT WAS

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OBVIOUS THAT THE SOVIET LEADER DID NOT FEEL HIMSELF
IN A POSITION TO PUSH FOR ANY MORE IN THE FACE OF
ANTICIPATED OPPOSITION OF HIS MILITARY COMMANDERS.
MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS, WHO WERE NOT UNINFORMED ABOUT
AMERICAN OPINION AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES IN THIS
AREA, PROBABLY FELT ALL THEY HAD TO DO WAS TO WAIT
FOR A YEAR OR SO AND THEN INTERNAL PRESSURES IN THE US
WOULD BRING ABOUT UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. BAHR'S
NET CONCLUSION WAS THAT PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS TO
MOVE RAPIDLY TOWARDS ANY SIGNIFICANT AND BALANCED
REDUCTIONS WERE LAMENTABLY SMALL.

4. IN A SEPARATE JUNE 18 MEETING WITH EMBOFF, GERMAN
MBFR DEL CHIEF RUTH ACKNOWLEDGED THE GROWING STRENGTH
AND CONFIDENCE OF DEFMIN LEBER ON THE STATIONED/
INDIGENOUS ISSUE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE SUPPORT OF
BAHR. NONETHELESS, RUTH THOUGHT THE ALLIES EVENTUALLY
MIGHT FIND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULATION IN THE COPENHAGEN
REMARKS OF FONMINS SCHEEL AND VAN DER STOEL. LIKE
LEBER AT THE DPC, SCHEEL HAD SPOKEN OF " REACH(ING) AN
UNDERSTANDING ALONG THE LINES OF US OPTION- I TO SEEK
AN ARRANGEMENT IN ONE PAPER FOR STATIONED AND
INDIGENOUS FORCES". SCHEEL ADDED THAT " REDUCTION OF
STATIONED FORCES COULD TAKE PLACE YEARS BEFORE A
SECOND PHASE INVOLVING REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS FORCES"
AND THAT " ELEMENTS OF (US) OPTION- III COULD BE ADDED
TO THIS ARRANGEMENT". (NOTE: THE IMPORTANT WORD
" YEARS" DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE OFFICIAL NATO TRANSCRIPT
OF SCHEEL'S REMARKS. END NOTE)

5. RUTH SAID THE GERMANS UNDERSTAND VAN DER STOEL TO
HAVE SUGGESTED PHASED MBFR NEGOTIATIONS (I. E. US
OPTION- I) PER AN " OVERALL PROGRAM" (I. E. SCHEEL'S
REFERENCE TO " PAPER"), WITH SOME TYPE OF " ASSURANCE"
IN THE FIRST PHASE (PERHAPS IN THE OVERALL PROGRAM--
PAPER) THAT THERE COULD BE POST- FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS
INVOLVING INDIGENOUS FORCES. WHILE LEBER IS INSISTING

ON INCLUDING INDIGENOUS FORCES IN INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS
WITH SEPARATE, LATER IMPLEMENTATION, AND WHILE FRG
MAY IN ANY CASE NEED EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS ON INDIGENOUS
FORCE CUTS THAN DO DUTCH, RUTH HOPED BONN MIGHT THIS

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SUMMER BE ABLE TO MOVE TOWARD SOME VARIATION OF THE
ABOVE POSITION.

6. IN A SEPARATE LUNCHEON MEETING JUNE 19 WITH THE
BRITISH EMBASSY EXPERT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY MATTERS,
HELD AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. EMBOFF WAS TOLD THAT
HMG HAD NOTED THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT IN COPENHAGEN
FAVORING INITIAL FOCUS ON STATIONED FORCE CUTS BUT WAS
SOMEWHAT SURPRISED THAT THE US HAD NOT PUSHED HARDER
IN THE DPC AND NAC MINISTERIALS FOR ITS POSITION AGAINST
FRG POSTURE OF SIMULTANEOUS NEGOTIATION BUT SEPARATE
IMPLEMENTATION OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCE CUTS.
BRITISH OFFICIAL SAID LEBER WAS NOW ARGUING WITHIN
THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE US PREFERRED INITIAL
STATIONED FORCE CUT NEGOTIATIONS BUT WAS NOT PRESSING
THE MATTER URGENTLY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, BRITISH
EMBOFF SAID UK WONDERED WHETHER US MIGHT IN THE END BE
ABLE TO ACCEPT THIS FRG POSITION.

7. IN REPLY TO BRITISH OFFICIAL, EMBOFF SAID THAT
THE SECRETARY'S NAC MINISTERIAL STATEMENT, LIKE THAT
OF SECDEF- DESIGNATE SCHLESINGER AT BRUSSELS, HAD MADE
CLEAR THE FIRM US VIEW THAT INITIAL MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON STATIONED FORCES, PARTICULARLY
US AND SOVIET; BUT GIVEN THE LEBER STATEMENT AT THE
JUNE 7 DPC AND THE GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER'S JUNE 8
DIE ZEIT INTERVIEW, CONFRONTATION AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL
SEEMED UNWISE. NOW THAT THE FRG HAD BEEN CLEARLY
ISOLATED IN COPENHAGEN, THE US HOPED THE ISSUE WOULD
BE QUICKLY SETTLED IN NATO, ALONG THE LINES OF THE
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, EMBOFF
EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT A HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHE

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 IO-03 OIC-01 L-02

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 AEC-05 MBFR-02 ACDA-10

OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-10 NEA-06 PRS-01 SAJ-01 RSR-01

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R 201042 Z JUN 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5817

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

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AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 08785

LIMDIS

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL; HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; SHAPE FOR INTAF.

BY BRITISH AND OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES URGING THE FRG
IN THE INTEREST OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY TO GO ALONG
WITH INITIAL FOCUS ON STATIONED FORCE CUT NEGOTIATIONS
COULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL.

8. BRITISH OFFICIAL SAID HE AGREED, AND UNDERSTOOD
THE ADVANTAGES OF A EUROPEAN RATHER THAN US DEMARCHE,
BUT THOUGHT SUCH A DEMARCHE WOULD HAVE TO BE AT THE
POLITICAL LEVEL, PROBABLY TO THE CHANCELLOR, TO BE
GENUINELY EFFECTIVE. BRITISH EMBOFF SAID HE THOUGHT
LONDON WAS LIKELY TO ACCORD " SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION"

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TO AN APPROPRIATE US DEMARCHE SUGGESTING SUCH A
BRITISH (AND IF POSSIBLE BROADER EUROPEAN) APPROACH
TO THE FRG. BUT GIVEN THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT LEBER
HAD WON FROM BAHR AND HELMUT SCHMIDT, BRITISH EMBOFF
ALSO SAID US MUST THEN MAKE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO
LONDON (AND OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES) ITS DETERMINATION

TO CONFINE INITIAL NEGOTIATION FOCUS TO STATIONED FORCES. BRITISH OFFICIAL SAID LONDON WAS NOT YET CONVINCED THAT WASHINGTON WAS OF ONE MIND ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER.

9. COMMENT: EGON BAHR'S INTENTION TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE MBFR/ CSCE AREAS IS A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE. IT IS BOUND TO RESULT IN A BITTER DISPUTE BETWEEN SCHEEL AND BAHR OVER BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL OF THESE PROJECTS. GUIDO BRUNNER (WITH SCHEEL'S SUPPORT) AND BAHR WILL INTENSIFY THEIR LONG STANDING QUARREL OVER THE IMPORTANCE OF CSCE. BRUNNER, DRAWING ON SUPPORT OF BONN'S OTHER EC- NINE COLLEAGUES, WILL ARGUE FOR TOUGH WESTERN CSCE POSITIONS AND PATIENT TACTICS; BAHR, WHO DISPARAGES THE IMPORTANCE OF CSCE, WOULD CONTINUE TO ACCORD MORE SYMPATHETIC EAR TO SOVIET AMB FALIN'S FREQUENT COMPLAINTS OVER " BRUNNER'S STALLING", WITH THE HOPE OF WINNING SOME SOVIET COUNTER- CONCESSIONS PERHAPS ON INNER- GERMAN MATTERS.

10. BUT BAHR'S NEW ROLE IS BOUND TO HAVE ITS MOST IMPORTANT IMPACT IN THE MBFR ENTERPRISE. IF BAHR IS IN FACT DETERMINED THAT INITIAL MBFR NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDE INDIGENOUS FORCES, IT WILL PROVE DIFFICULT TO BUDGE THE FRG, EVEN GIVEN HIGH LEVEL APPEALS. BAHR IS LIKELY TO WIN SUBSTANTIAL GROUND WITH HIS ARGUMENT THAT ASSYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES, THE CHIEF GOAL OF THE US, FRG AND THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, IS ONLY PLAUSIBLE GIVEN WESTERN READINESS TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS IN INDIGENOUS EUROPEAN FORCES ASSYMMETRICAL TO NATO.

11. RECOMMENDATION: GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD APPEAR TO US BEST TO AVOID INJECTING THE

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UNITED STATES DIRECTLY AT THIS TIME INTO THIS INTERNAL GERMAN GOVT POLITICAL DISPUTE. INITIALLY, THE US MIGHT DO BETTER TO: (A) MAKE WHOLLY CLEAR IN THE NAC, WITH SUPPORT OF THE ALLIES, OUR FIRM WISH FOR AN URGENT RESOLUTION OF THE STATIONED/ INDIGENOUS ISSUE TO THE EFFECT OF INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS ON STATIONED FORCE CUTS AND CONSTRAINTS WITHIN AN OVERALL WORK PROGRAM INVOLVING SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ALSO ON INDIGENOUS FORCES; (B) ADVOCATE BRITISH (AND IF POSSIBLE BROAD ALLIED EUROPEAN) DEMARCHE(S) AT HIGH LEVEL IN BONN. THESE TACTICS MAY PROVE UNSUCCESSFUL, BUT COULD AT LEAST SENSITIZE AND SOFTEN UP THE TOPGERMAN OFFICIALS TO OUR INTERESTS WITHOUT DIRECTLY INVOLVING US IN THIS DISPUTE. IT WOULD THEN BE POSSIBLE, IF WASHINGTON

CONSIDERS IT ADVISABLE, FOR THE USG TO WEIGH IN BILATERALLY AT THE APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL. BUT GIVEN THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY AMONG GERMAN MINISTERS AND KEY OFFICIALS, WE SHARE THE BRITISH EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT THAT SUCH A US DEMARCHE WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENTED TO THE CHANCELLOR TO HAVE ANY CREDIBLE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE GIVEN THE CURRENT STATE OF AGITATION IN BONN OVER RELATED US STATEMENTS AND DEMANDS IN THE DEFENSE AND BURDENSHARING FIELDS.

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TAGS: PARM, GW
To: DOD
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SECSTATE WASHDC INFO HELSINKI
LONDON
MULTIPLE
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